A Multi Period Equilibrium Pricing Model by Pirvu, Traian A. & Zhang, Huayue
ar
X
iv
:1
20
5.
61
93
v1
  [
ma
th.
OC
]  
28
 M
ay
 20
12
A Multi Period Equilibrium Pricing Model∗
Traian A. Pirvu
Dept of Mathematics & Statistics
McMaster University
1280 Main Street West
Hamilton, ON, L8S 4K1
tpirvu@math.mcmaster.ca
Huayue Zhang
Dept of Finance
Nankai University
94 Weijin Road
Tianjin, China, 300071
hyzhang69@nankai.edu.cn
October 31, 2018
Abstract
In this paper, we propose an equilibrium pricing model in a dynamic multi-period
stochastic framework with uncertain income streams. In an incomplete market,
there exist two traded risky assets (e.g. stock/commodity and weather derivative)
and a non-traded underlying (e.g. temperature). The risk preferences are of ex-
ponential (CARA) type with a stochastic coefficient of risk aversion. Both time
consistent and time inconsistent trading strategies are considered. We obtain the
equilibriums prices of a contingent claim written on the risky asset and non-traded
underlying. By running numerical experiments we examine how the equilibriums
prices vary in response to changes in model parameters.
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1 Introduction
Hitherto, there has been an increasing literature on pricing contingent claims written on
non-tradable underlyings in a dynamic multi-period equilibrium framework. One example
of such contingent claim is a weather derivative, in which case the underlying is the
temperature process. One approach in pricing this financial instruments is to use a multi-
period stochastic equilibrium model. In financial economics there is a big literature on
this issue.
Rubinstein (1976) considers a multi-period state-preference equilibrium model with-
out explicit modelling of production/investment. Brennan (1979) looks at a multiperiod
equilibrium problem in which the representative agent exhibits constant risk aversion.
Bhattacharya (1981) extends the model of Rubinstein (1976) to show that risk/return
tradeoffs are linear relations linking instantaneous expected returns of assets to the in-
stantaneous covariances of returns with aggregate consumption. Bizid and Jouini (2001)
derives restrictions on the equilibrium state-price deflators independent on the choices of
utility function in an incomplete market. Camara (2003) obtains preference-free option
prices in a discrete equilibrium model where representative agent has exponential utility
and aggregate wealth together with the underlying asset price have transformed normal
distributions.
Our paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two exogenous assets, one trad-
able and one non-tradable. A derivative security, written on the tradable and non-tradable
assets, is priced in equilibrium by a representative agent who receives unspanned random
income within an incomplete multi-period market. Cao and Wei (2004), Lee and Oren
(2009), Lee and Oren (2010), Cheridito et al (2011) are related to our work. Cao and
Wei (2004) generalizes the model of Lucas (1978) to provide an equilibrium framework
for valuing weather derivatives in a multi-period setting. Lee and Oren (2009) explores a
single-period equilibrium pricing model in a multi commodity setting and mean-variance
preferences. Lee and Oren (2010) is a follow up in a multi-period framework. Cheridito
et al (2011) establishes results on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynam-
ically incomplete financial markets with preferences of monetary type and heterogeneous
agents.
In our model the representative agent has risk preferences of exponential type, time
and state dependent, with time changing coefficient of risk aversion. Inspired by Gordon
and St-Amour (2000), we assume that the risk aversion coefficient is a stochastic process.
Gordon and St-Amour (2000) motivates this change by the fact that it can explain asset-
price movements which fixed preference paradigm can not explain. Lately, the issue of time
changing risk aversion received some attention in the financial literature. For instance,
Barberis (2001) considers a model in which the loss aversion depends on prior gains and
losses, so it may change through time. Danthine et al (2004) allows the representative
agent’s coefficient of relative risk aversion to vary with the underlying economy’s growth
rate. Gordon and St-Amour (2004) explains equity premium puzzle by state-dependent
risk preferences. Yuan and Chen (2006) shows that dynamic risk aversion plays a critical
role in the dynamics of asset price fluctuations.
A time changing risk preference leads to time inconsistent investment strategies. It
means that an investor may have an incentive to deviate from the optimal strategies which
he/she computed at some past time. In order to overcome this issue, Bjork and Murgoci
(2010) develops a theory for stochastic control problems which are time inconsistent in the
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sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle; they consider the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium strategies as a substitute for the optimal strategies.
This paper considers both time consistent and time inconsistent optimal strategies.
Time consistent optimal strategies are the subgame perfect strategies. Time inconsis-
tent optimal strategies are the classical optimal strategies given that the agent does not
update his/her risk preferences. Time consistent (inconsistent) equilibrium price is de-
fined by imposing the market clearing condition for time consistent (inconsistent) optimal
strategies.
In the present work the exogenous assets have stochastic drifts and volatilities. It may
be that they depend on each other (in a weather model we consider a commodity whose
volatility is influenced by the temperature process). A derivative security is priced in
equilibrium within this model. Our main result is an iterative algorithm which yields the
equilibrium prices (time consistent and time inconsistent). At each stage the equilibrium
prices depend on the current risk aversion level, and all previous wealth and risk aversion
levels. The algorithm constructs recursively one period pricing kernels. Moreover, the
time inconsistent equilibrium pricing kernel equals the marginal utility. We prove that
the equilibrium pricing measures are martingale measures so the equilibrium prices (time
consistent and time inconsistent) are arbitrage free. Numerical experiments shed light
into the structure of equilibriums prices. We show that utility indifference prices and
equilibriums ones are different. The utility indifference price was introduced by Hodges
and Neuberger (1989). By now, there are several papers on this topic; we recall only a
few. 1 Pirvu and Zhang (2011) derives utility indifference prices in a model with time
changing risk aversion.
Next, we consider examples in which the non-traded underlying affects the income,
thus creating an incentive for the agent to hold the derivative in order to hedge the risk.
Our plots show that equilibriums prices are increasing in risk aversion, fact explained by
an increased hedging demand. We add a stochastic unspanned component to the income
and this slightly decreases the equilibrium prices. This is explained by a decrease in the
hedging demand, which is a consequence of income being only partial affected by the non-
traded underlying. Finally, in a regime switching model we explore the effect of changing
risk aversion. Here we find that an increase of twenty percent in risk aversion can cause a
percentage change in the time consistent equilibrium price (with the benchmark being the
time inconsistent equilibrium price) anywhere between minus four and seventeen percent.
The optimal strategies are obtained by backward induction. First order conditions
together with the market clearing give the equilibrium prices. We consider a partial
equilibrium model because of the problem we want to address. However our method can
be easily extended to a full equilibrium model (in fact the computations are simpler in
that case).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 provides the equilibrium pricing valuation. Numerical experiments are presented
in the section 4. Proofs of the results are delegated to an appendix.
1 on discrete time Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004), Musiela et al (2009); on continuous time Hen-
derson (2002), Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2004); for an overview see Henderson Hobson (2004).
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2 The Model
We consider a multi-period stochastic model of investment. The trading horizon is [0, T ],
with T a exogenous finite horizon. There are N + 1 trading dates: tn = nh, for n =
0, 1, · · · , N, and h = T
N
. Let (b1, b2, ..., bd) := (b1tn , b
2
tn
, ..., bdtn)n=0,1,...,∞, be a d-dimensional
binomial random walk on a complete probability space (Ω,F , {Ftn},P). The random walk
is assumed symmetric under P in the sense that
P(∆bitn = ±1) = 1/2, i = 1, 2, ..., d. (2.1)
There are three securities available for trading in our model; a riskless bond, a primary
asset (e.g. stock or commodity) and a derivative security. We take the bond as numeraire,
thus it can be assumed to offer zero interest rate. The primary asset price process C :=
{Ctn ;n = 0, 1, . . . , N}, follows the difference equation :

∆Ctn = Ctn(µ
c
tn
h+ σctn
√
h∆b1tn), n = 0, 1, ...N − 1
C0 = c > 0,
(2.2)
for some adapted drift process µc := {µct ; t = 0, h . . . , (N−1)h,Nh} and volatility process
σc := {σct ; t = 0, h . . . , (N − 1)h,Nh} which are chosen so that the commodity price re-
mains positive. The derivative security is written on the primary asset and a non-tradable
underlying. The non-traded asset S := {Stn ;n = 0, 1, . . . , N}, follows the difference equa-
tion :{
∆Stn = Stn(µ
s
tn
h+ σstn
√
h(ρ∆b1tn +
√
1− ρ2∆b2tn)), n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1
S0 = s > 0,
(2.3)
for some adapted drift process µs := {µst ; t = 0, h . . . , (N − 1)h,Nh}, volatility process
σs := {σst ; t = 0, h . . . , (N−1)h,Nh}, and a correlation coefficient ρ, with |ρ| < 1. The two
dimensional process P = (C, S), exogenously given, is referred to as the forward process.
The derivative security D := {Dtn ;n = 0, 1, . . . , N} is to be priced in equilibrium.
Therefore we have a partial equilibrium model. It is motivated by a situation in which the
primary asset and derivative are priced in different markets. Take for example energy and
weather derivatives. Although correlated (in California it was observed a high correlation
between energy prices and temperature process) energy and weather derivatives are priced
within different markets.
2.1 Trading strategies
Let αtn be the wealth invested in the primary asset at time tn, and βtn the number of
shares of derivative held at time tn; denote pitn := {αtn , βtn} ∈ Ftn, n = 0, 1 . . . , N − 1.
The value of a self-financed portfolio satisfies the following stochastic difference equation:
∆Xpitn := αtn(µ
c
tn
h+ σctn
√
h∆b1tn) + βtn(∆Dtn + ϕ(tn, Ctn, Stn)h). (2.4)
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Here ϕ(tn, Ctn , Stn)h is the dividend paid for holding the stock on [tn, tn+1]. At maturity,
tN := T = Nh, the representative agent in this economy receives random income ItN ,
which is FT adapted. Thus, his/her final wealth is
W pitN = X
pi
tN
+ ItN . (2.5)
The random income may depend on all the random walks {b1, b2, ..., bd}, so it may not
be spanned by the existing assets. This makes our market model incomplete.
2.2 Risk Preferences
The representative agent utility is assumed to be of exponential type, time and state
dependent. Moreover, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is a stochastic process γtn,{Ftn} adapted, n = 0, 1 . . . , N − 1. More precisely
U(x, tn, ω) = − exp(−γtn(ω)x). (2.6)
This modeling approach is not new; in the introduction we pointed out a number of papers
which consider time changing risk aversion. The performance of an investment strategy
pi is measured by the above expected utility criterion applied to the final wealth. At time
tn the optimization criterion is
sup
pi∈Πtn
E[−e−γtnWpitN |Ftn ]. (2.7)
Here n = 0, 1 . . . , N − 1, W pitN is given by (2.5), and Πtn denotes the set of admissible
trading strategies,
Πtn := {pitn , pitn+1 , · · · , pitN−1 : pitk ∈ Ftk , such that E|Xpitk | <∞, k = n, n + 1 . . .N − 1}.
(2.8)
2.3 Optimal Time Inconsistent Strategies
They are the classical optimal strategies given that the risk preferences are not updated.
More precisely pˆi ∈ Πt0 is an optimal time inconsistent strategy if it satisfies
pˆi = arg sup
pi∈Πt0
E
P[− exp(−γt0W pitN )|Ft0 ]. (2.9)
They are called time inconsistent because they fail to remain optimal at later times tn, in
the sense that
pˆi 6= arg sup
pi∈Πtn
E
P[− exp(−γtnW pitN )|Ftn]. (2.10)
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2.4 Optimal Time Consistent Strategies
In this section, we introduce the optimal time consistent strategies defined as subgame
perfect strategies. First, let us consider the time period [(N − 1)h,Nh] (recall that
tN = T = Nh). At time (N − 1)h consider the optimization problem:
(P1) sup
pi∈ΠtN−1
E[− exp(−γtN−1W pitN )|FtN−1 ]. (2.11)
In our model sup in (P1) is attained and we denote
pi∗tN−1 = arg maxpi∈ΠtN−1
E[− exp(−γtN−1W pitN )|FtN−1 ]. (2.12)
On the time period [(N − 2)h,Nh], restrict to the trading strategies pi be of the form:
pi =


pi∗tN−1 , on [(N − 1)h,Nh),
pitN−2 , on [(N − 2)h, (N − 1)h),
(2.13)
for an arbitrary FtN−2− adapted control pitN−2 such that (pitN−2 , pi∗tN−1) ∈ ΠtN−2 ; consider
the optimization problem
(P2) sup
pi∈ΠtN−2
E[− exp(−γtN−2W pitN )|FtN−2 ]. (2.14)
In our model sup in (P2) is attained and we denote
(pi∗tN−2 , pi
∗
tN−1
) = arg max
pi∈ΠtN−2
E[− exp(−γtN−2W pitN )|FtN−2 ]. (2.15)
Further we proceed iteratively. On the time period [(N−n)h,Nh] one restricts to trading
strategies pi of the form:
pi =


pi∗tk , for k = N − (n− 1), N − (n− 2), · · · , N − 1,
pitk for k = N − n,
(2.16)
for an arbitrary FtN−n− adapted control pitN−n such that (pitN−n , pi∗tk){k=N−n+1,··· ,N−1} ∈
ΠtN−n . Consider the optimization problem
(Pn) max
pi∈ΠtN−n
E[− exp(−γtN−nW pitN )|FtN−n ]. (2.17)
The sup in (Pn) is attained and we denote
(pi∗tN−n , pi
∗
tN−n+1
, · · · , pi∗tN−1) = arg maxpi∈ΠtN−n
E[− exp(−γtN−nW pitN )|FtN−n ]. (2.18)
The optimal time consistent strategy is pi∗ = (pi∗t0 , pi
∗
t1
, · · · , pi∗tN ).
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2.5 Time Consistent versus Time Inconsistent Strategies
Let us recall that time inconsistencies in this model are due to time changing risk aversion.
Indeed in the case of constant risk aversion, the optimal time consistent and time incon-
sistent strategies coincide, i.e. pi∗ = pˆi. In general, it is hard to show that the optimal
time consistent strategy outperforms the optimal time inconsistent strategy. We show
that this is the case if the risk preferences are updated in the following two period model.
Let us assume that It2 = 0, and only one asset is available for trading (the primary asset
with constant drift and volatility). It is claimed that
E[− exp(−γt1W pi
∗
t2
)|Ft1 ] ≥ E[− exp(−γt1W pˆit2)|Ft1]. (2.19)
Indeed in this model it can be shown that pi∗t1 = pˆit1 , and hence W
pi∗
t1
= W pˆit1 . By the
definition of optimal time consistent strategies, (2.19) yields.
3 Equilibrium Valuation
We assume that there exists a representative agent with risk preferences given by (2.6).
The representative agent trades in C and D in order to maximize expected utility of
his/her final wealth. This can be achieved by the optimal time inconsistent strategy
pˆi = (αˆ, βˆ) if the representative agent does not update his/her risk preferences. Otherwise,
the optimal time consistent strategy pi∗ = (α∗, β∗) will be used. Thus, depending on
weather or not the representative agent updates his/her risk preferences we introduce two
notions of equilibriums: time consistent and time inconsistent. They are given by the
market clearing condition in the formal definition below.
Definition 3.1 Given the terminal payoff DtN and the dividend stream ϕ(tn, Ctn , Stn)h,
Dtn is a time consistent equilibrium price if and only if
β∗tn = 1,
for every n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1. Likewise, Dtn is a time inconsistent equilibrium price if and
only if
βˆtn = 1,
for every n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1.
This simply says that there is one unit of derivative in the market and it is priced such
that “it is optimal” (time consistent or time inconsistent) for the representative agent to
acquire it. The interest of the representative agent in holding the derivative comes from
the fact that his/her income is exposed to the non-traded asset S; thus, the risk of income
fluctuations due to S can be hedged by trading D. Let rctn , given by
rctn :=
µctn
σctn
, (3.1)
be the market price of risk (MPR) for the primary asset which is assumed positive. We
choose time length h small enough such that 1 ≥ rctn
√
h.
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3.1 Single Period
In this case the optimal time consistent and time inconsistent strategies coincide and so do
the corresponding equilibriums. Define AtN−1 := {∆b1tN−1 = 1} and ActN−1 := {∆b1tN−1 =
−1}.
Theorem 3.1 The equilibrium price at time tN−1 is given by
DtN−1 = E
Q∗ [DtN + ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h|FtN−1 ],
where the probability measure Q∗ is defined by
dQ∗
dP
= ΛtNE[
dQ∗
dP
|FtN−1 ].
The pricing kernel ΛtN is
ΛtN :=


λtN−1
e
−γtN−1
[DtN
+ItN
]
E[e
−γtN−1
[DtN
+ItN
]|AtN−1∨FtN−1 ]
, if ω ∈ AtN−1
λtN−1
e
−γtN−1
[DtN
+ItN
]
E[e
−γtN−1
[DtN
+ItN
]|ActN−1∨FtN−1 ]
, if ω ∈ ActN−1 ,
(3.2)
with
λtN−1 =
{
1− rctN−1
√
h, if ω ∈ AtN−1
1 + rctN−1
√
h, if ω ∈ ActN−1 .
(3.3)
The optimal trading strategy is given by
α∗tN−1 =
1
2γtN−1σ
c
tN−1
√
h
log
(
1 + rctN−1
√
h
1− rctN−1
√
h
)
+
1
2γ(JtN−1)σ
c
tN−1
√
h
log
(
E[e−γtN−1 [DtN+ItN ]|AtN−1 ∨ FtN−1 ]
E[e−γtN−1 [DtN+ItN ]|ActN−1 ∨ FtN−1 ]
)
.
Proof of this Theorem is done in Appendix A.

Next we prove that the probability measure Q∗ is a martingale measure so the equi-
librium prices are arbitrage free.
Lemma 3.2 If the dividend ϕ = 0, then the traded assets {Ctn}n=N−1,N and {Dtn}n=N−1,N
are martingales under Q∗.
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Proof: {Dtn}n=N−1,N is martingale under Q∗ by definition. Next we show that
{Ctn}n=N−1,N is martingale under Q∗. It suffices to prove that with n = N − 1
E
Q∗ [
Ctn+1
Ctn
|Ftn] = EQ
∗
[1 + σctn
√
h(rctn
√
h+∆b1tn)|Ftn ]
= 1 + σctn
√
hEQ
∗
[(rctn
√
h+∆b1tn)|Ftn ] (3.4)
= 1. (3.5)
This is the case if
E
Q∗ [(rctn
√
h +∆b1tn)|Ftn] = 0. (3.6)
When n = N − 1, (3.6) is equivalent to
rctN−1
√
h+ 1
2
E
[
ΛtNE[
dQ∗
dP
|FtN−1 ]|AtN−1 ∨ FtN−1
]
+
rctn
√
h− 1
2
E
[
ΛtNE[
dQ∗
dP
|FtN−1 ]|ActN−1 ∨ FtN−1
]
=
1− (rctN−1)2h
2
E[
dQ∗
dP
|FtN−1 ] +
(rctN−1)
2h− 1
2
E[
dQ∗
dP
|FtN−1 ] = 0,
so the claim yields.

3.2 Multiple Periods
Let us define the sets AtN−n := {∆b1tN−n = 1} and ActN−n := {∆b1tN−n = −1}; to ease
notations, let us denote
Etn [·] := E[·|Ftn], Etn [·|G] := E[·|G ∨ Ftn],
for every G ⊂ F . The equilibrium prices are computed by a recursive algorithm. Imagine
that they were found at all prior times and now we want to find them at tN−n. Define the
random variables Y ∗tN−(n−1) and YˆtN−(n−1) by:
e
−γtN−nY ∗tN−(n−1) : = EtN−n+1
[
e
−γtN−n [
N−1∑
k=N−(n−1)
∆X∗tk
+ItN ]]
, (3.7)
and
e
−γtN−n YˆtN−(n−1) : = EtN−n+1
[
e
−γt0 [
N−1∑
k=N−(n−1)
∆Xˆtk+ItN ]]
. (3.8)
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Here
∆X∗tk = α
∗
tk
(µctkh+
√
hσctk∆b
1
tk
) + ∆Dtk + ϕ(tk, Ctk , Stk)h,
for any k = N −n+1, · · · , N −2, N −1; the optimal time consistent strategy α∗tk is given
by
α∗tk =
1
2γtkσ
c
tk
√
h
log
(
1 + rctk
√
h
1− rctk
√
h
)
+
1
2γtkσ
c
tk
√
h
log
(
Etk [e
−γtk [Dtk+1+Y ∗tk+1 ]|Atk ]
Etk [e
−γtk [Dtk+1+Y ∗tk+1 ]|Actk ]
)
. (3.9)
Moreover
∆Xˆtk = αˆtk(µ
c
tk
h+
√
hσctk∆b
1
tk
) + ∆Dtk + ϕ(tk, Ctk , Stk)h,
for any k = N − n + 1, · · · , N − 2, N − 1; the optimal time inconsistent strategy αˆtk is
given by by
αˆtk =
1
2γt0σ
c
tk
√
h
log
(
1 + rctk
√
h
1− rctk
√
h
)
+
1
2γt0σ
c
tk
√
h
log
(
Etk [e
−γt0 [Dtk+1+Yˆtk+1 ]|Atk ]
Etk [e
−γt0 [Dtk+1+Yˆtk+1 ]|Actk ]
)
. (3.10)
Notice that Y ∗tN−(n−1) and YˆtN−(n−1) are the certainty equivalents (time consistent and time
inconsistent) at time n − 1. In the special case of constant coefficient of absolute risk
aversion they are equal. Next, define the one step period pricing kernels Λ∗tN−n+1 and
ΛˆtN−n+1 by
Λ∗tN−n+1 :=


λtN−n
e
−γtN−n
[DtN−n+1
+Y ∗tN−n+1
]
EtN−n
[e
−γtN−n
[DtN−n+1
+Y ∗
tN−n+1
]|AtN−n ]
, if ω ∈ AtN−n
λtN−n
e
−γtN−n
[DtN−n+1
+Y ∗tN−n+1
]
EtN−n
[e
−γtN−n
[DtN−n+1
+Y ∗
tN−n+1
]|ActN−n ]
, if ω ∈ ActN−n ,
(3.11)
ΛˆtN−n+1 :=


λtN−n
e
−γt0
[DtN−n+1
+YˆtN−n+1
]
EtN−n
[e
−γt0
[DtN−n+1
+YˆtN−n+1
]|AtN−n ]
, if ω ∈ AtN−n
λtN−n
e
−γt0
[DtN−n+1
+YˆtN−n+1
]
EtN−n
[e
−γt0
[DtN−n+1
+YˆtN−n+1
]|ActN−n ]
. if ω ∈ ActN−n ,
(3.12)
Here
λtN−n =
{
1− rctN−n
√
h, if ω ∈ AtN−n
1 + rctN−n
√
h, if ω ∈ ActN−n .
(3.13)
The following Theorem is the main result of the paper.
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Theorem 3.2 The time consistent equilibrium price at time tN−n is given by
DtN−n = E
Q∗
tN−n
[DtN−n+1 + ϕ(tN−n, CtN−n , StN−n)h],
where the probability measure Q∗ is defined by
dQ∗
dP
= Λ∗tNΛ
∗
tN−1
. . .Λ∗t1 .
The optimal time consistent strategy (in the primary asset) is α∗ = (α∗t0 , α
∗
t1
, · · · , α∗tN ),
with α∗tk defined by (3.9) . The time inconsistent equilibrium price at time tN−n is given
by
DtN−n = E
Qˆ
tN−n
[DtN−n+1 + ϕ(tN−n, CtN−n , StN−n)h],
where the probability measure Qˆ is defined by
dQˆ
dP
= ΛˆtN ΛˆtN−1 . . . Λˆt1 .
The optimal time inconsistent strategy (in the primary asset) is αˆ = (αˆt0 , αˆt1 , · · · , αˆtN ),
with αˆtk defined by (3.10) .
Proof of this Theorem is done in Appendix B.

For the time inconsistent equilibrium price, we recover the following classical result.
Corollary 3.3 The time inconsitent pricing kernel equals the marginal utility, i.e.,
ΛˆtN−n+1 =
EtN−n+1 [U
′(WˆtN )]
EtN−n [U
′(WˆtN )]
, (3.14)
where U(x) = −e−γx, and WˆtN ( see (2.5) ) is the optimal time inconsistent wealth.
Proof of this Corollary is done in Appendix C.

Lemma 3.4 If the dividend ϕ = 0, then the traded assets {Ctn}n=0,1,...,N and {Dtn}n=0,1,...N
are martingales under Q∗.
Proof: The proof is similar to Lemma 3.2 so is skipped.

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4 Numerical examples
We specialize to a regime switching model. A discrete time finite state homogeneous
Markov chain (MC) J := (Jtn)n=0,1,...,∞ is defined on (Ω,F , {Ftn},P) and it takes values
in the state space S = {0, 1} (which represents two states of the market, bull and bear).
The n−step transition matrix P (n) = (P nij), is defined by
P
(n)
ij := P(Jtn = j|Jt0 = i), i, j = 0, 1 n = 0, 1, ...,∞,
where P
(0)
ij = 1 when i = j, otherwise P
(0)
ij = 0. We assume that the distribution of J0 is
known, and
P(J0 = i|F0) = P(J0 = i), i = 0, 1.
The risk aversion is defined by γtn = γ(Jtn .) In this section we give a concrete example;
take the electricity industry one of the most weather-sensitive businesses in the economy.
When the temperature increases there is a higher demand for electricity due to the usage
of air conditioners. In turn this will lead to higher energy prices. In our model an energy
provider hedges the weather exposure by selling one share of weather derivative to the
representative agent. This is designed such that it has a higher payoff when temperature
is high. The representative agent has an incentive to buy this product because of his/her
income exposure to weather.
Consider an European call option on the temperature with a strike price K = 10;
assume that h = 0.3, C0 = c = 10, S0 = s = 10 (this is normalized and it corresponds
to 85 Fahrenheit degrees), ρ = 0.5, µc = 0.1, σc = 0.2, µs = 0.3, σs = 0.50. The energy
price process (Ct) follows (2.2); the market price of risk (MPR) of the commodity (r
c
t ) is
defined
(rctn)
2 = (arctan(St) +
pi
2
).
Therefore higher temperatures lead to an increased (MPR).
4.1 Single period
In this section, we present a numerical example of single-period, N = 1. Recall that in
this case time consistent equilibrium coincides with time inconsistent equilibrium. Let
D1 = (S1 −K)+, and for simplicity assume ϕ = 0.
4.1.1 Equilibrium Price versus Indifference Price
The paths of the typical trajectories of the forward processes (C, S), are plotted in Fig.1,
and the sample path of MPR in Fig.2.
It is easy, within our model, to compare numerically equilibrium price and indifference
price of D1.This is done in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, where we take ρ = 0.5 and γ = 0.7.
Next we introduce the income I1 = 7e
−0.5(S1−s)h. Fig. 6 shows that the equilibrium
price is an increasing function of the risk aversion γ. This is explained by an increase in
12
the hedging demand when the agent becomes more risk averse. This increase is due to
weather impact on the income.
Next we add a nonspanned component to the income
I1 = 7e
−0.5(S1−s)h + 5e0.1h1{∆b10=1,∆b30=1} + 4e
0.1h1{∆b10=1,∆b30=−1}+
+2e0.1h1{∆b10=−1,∆b30=1} + e
0.1h1{∆b10=−1,∆b30=−1}.
Fig 7. shows the effect of this addition. The equilibrium price of the derivative is slightly
lower with nonspanned income. This is explained by the fact that in this case only a part
of the income is affected by weather, whence a lower hedging demand.
4.2 Two periods
Take N = 2, D2 = (S2 −K)+, and ϕ = 0. Moreover
I2 = 7e
−0.5(S2−s)h + 5e0.1h1{∆b11=1,∆b31=1} + 4e
0.1h1{∆b11=1,∆b31=−1}+
+2e0.1h1{∆b11=−1,∆b31=1} + e
0.1h1{∆b11=−1,∆b31=−1}.
Fig. 8 plots the time inconsistent equilibrium price with and without unspanned income.
The effect of the unspanned income becomes more pronounced with N = 2.
Fig. 9 plots the effect of time changing risk aversion. We are interested in the percentage
change of the time consistent equilibrium price when the benchmark is the time inconsis-
tent equilibrium price. We allowed the income to depend on the state of the economy.
I2 = 7e
(−0.5(S1−s))h + 10e0.03h1{J0=0,∆b31=1} + 8e
0.03h1{J0=0,∆b31=−1}+
+5e0.03h1{J0=1,∆b31=1} + 4e
0.03h1{J0=1,∆b31=−1}.
5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3.1
From (5.1) and (2.5), it follows that
EtN−1 [− exp(−γtN−1(XpitN + ItN ))] = EtN−1 [− exp(−γtN−1(XtN−1 +∆XpitN−1 + ItN ))]
= −e−γtN−1xEtN−1 [exp(−γtN−1(∆XpitN−1 + ItN ))]
:= −e−γtN−1xgN−1(α, β, ·),
where
∆XpitN−1 : = αtN−1(µ
c
tN−1
h+ σctN−1
√
h∆b1tN−1) + βtN−1(∆DtN−1 + ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h),
(5.1)
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and
gN−1(α, β, ·) := EtN−1 [exp(−γtN−1(∆XpitN−1 + ItN ))]
=
1
2
e
−γtN−1α(µctN−1h+σ
c
tN−1
√
h)
EtN−1
[
e−γtN−1β(∆DtN−1+ϕ(tN−1,CtN−1 ,StN−1)h)e−γtN−1ItN |AtN−1
]
+
1
2
e
−γtN−1α(µctN−1h−σ
c
tN−1
√
h)
EtN−1
[
e−γtN−1β(∆DtN−1+ϕ(tN−1,CtN−1 ,StN−1 )h)e−γtN−1 ItN |ActN−1
]
.
Recall that Atk := {∆b1tk = 1} and Actk := {∆b1tk = −1}. The function gN−1(α, β, ·) has
the following properties:
gN−1(0, 0, ·) = EtN−1 [e−γtN−1ItN ] ≤ 1;
For a fixed β, it follows that for small h
gN−1(∞, β, ·) =∞; gN−1(−∞, β, ·) =∞;
By arbitrage argument it follows that DtN−1 belongs to the interval
DtN−1(ω) ∈ [inf
Q
E
Q[DtN ], sup
Q
E
Q[DtN ]],
where Q ranges over the set of probability measures. Consequently,
∆DtN−1(ω) ∈ [DtN − sup
Q
E
Q[DtN ], DtN − inf
Q
E
Q[DtN ]].
Thus, the sets {ω : ∆DtN−1(ω) > 0}, and {ω : ∆DtN−1(ω) < 0} have positive probability.
This implies that
gN−1(α,∞, ·) =∞; gN−1(α,−∞, ·) =∞.
From the above analysis, it follows that the minimum of the function of g is a critical
point. First order conditions lead to
∂gN−1
∂α
=
−γtN−1(µctN−1h + σctN−1
√
h)
2
· e−γtN−1α(µctN−1h+σctN−1
√
h)
×EtN−1
[
e−γtN−1β(∆DtN−1+ϕ(tN−1,CtN−1 ,StN−1)h)e−γtN−1 ItN |AtN−1
]
+
−γtN−1(µctN−1h− σctN−1
√
h)
2
· e−γtN−1α(µctN−1h−σctN−1
√
h)
×EtN−1
[
e−γtN−1β(∆DtN−1+ϕ(tN−1,CtN−1 ,StN−1)h)e−γtN−1 ItN |ActN−1
]
= 0, (5.2)
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and
∂gN−1
∂β
=
1
2
e
−γtN−1α(µctN−1h+σ
c
tN−1
√
h)
e−γtN−1βϕ(tN−1,CtN−1 ,StN−1)h
×EtN−1
[
− γtN−1(∆DtN−1 + ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h) · e−γtN−1β∆DtN−1e−γtN−1ItN |AtN−1
]
+
1
2
e
−γtN−1α(µctN−1h−σ
c
tN−1
√
h)
e−γtN−1βϕ(tN−1,CtN−1 ,StN−1)h
×EtN−1
[
− γtN−1(∆DtN−1 + ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h) · e−γtN−1β∆DtN−1e−γtN−1ItN |ActN−1
]
= 0. (5.3)
Recall that
∆DtN−1 + ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h = DtN − EQ
∗
tN−1
[DtN ], (5.4)
for an equilibrium pricing measure Q∗ to be found. Since EQ
∗
tN−1
[DtN ] is FtN−1−measurable,
it follows that
α∗tN−1 =
1
2γ(i)σctN−1
√
h
log
(
1 + rctN−1
√
h
1− rctN−1
√
h
)
+
1
2γtN−1σ
c
tN−1
√
h
log
(
EtN−1 [e
−γtN−1β∗tN−1DtN e−γtN−1ItN |AtN−1 ]
EtN−1 [e
−γtN−1β∗tN−1DNe−γ(i)ItN |ActN−1 ]
)
.
By the equilibrium condition β∗tN−1 = 1 . This together with
∂gN−1
∂β
= 0 lead to
EtN−1
[
(∆DtN−1 + ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h)e
−γtN−1∆DtN−1e−γtN−1ItN |AtN−1
]
=
−e2γtN−1α∗tN−1σctN−1
√
h
EtN−1
[
(∆DtN−1+ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h)e
−γtN−1∆DtN−1e−γtN−1ItN |ActN−1
]
,
and
e
2γtN−1α
∗
tN−1
σctN−1
√
h
=
(1 + rctN−1
√
h)EtN−1 [e
−γtN−1DtN e−γtN−1ItN |AtN−1 ]
(1− rctN−1
√
h)EtN−1 [e
−γtN−1DtN e−γtN−1ItN |ActN−1 ]
. (5.5)
Combing the above equations leads to
2
1− rctN−1
√
h
E
Q∗
tN−1
[DtN ]
=
EtN−1 [DtN e
−γtN−1DtN e−γtN−1 ItN |AtN−1 ]
EtN−1 [e
−γtN−1DtN e−γtN−1ItN |AtN−1 ]
+
(1 + rctN−1
√
h)
(1− rctN−1
√
h)
EtN−1 [DtN e
−γtN−1DtN e−γtN−1 ItN |ActN−1 ]
EtN−1 [e
−γ(i)DtN e−γtN−1ItN |ActN−1 ]
.
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This together with (5.4) imply that:
DtN−1 − ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h =
1− rctN−1
√
h
2
EtN−1 [DtN e
−γtN−1DtN eγtN−1ItN |AtN−1 ]
EtN−1 [e
−γ(i)DtN eγ(i)ItN |AtN−1 ]
+
1 + rctN−1
√
h
2
EtN−1 [DtN e
−γtN−1DtN eγtN−1 ItN |ActN−1 ]
EtN−1 [e
−γtN−1DtN eγtN−1ItN |ActN−1 ]
.
Thus, the equilibrium price is
DtN−1 = EtN−1 [(DtN + ϕ(tN−1, CtN−1 , StN−1)h)ΛtN ],
where ΛtN was defined in (3.2).

5.2 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 3.2
We will prove the result for time consistent equilibrium; the proof for time inconsistent
equilibrium is similar and hence omitted. First consider the time period is [(N−n)h, (N−
n+ 1)h) and choose an arbitrary control pi = (α, β) for any Jtn ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
pi =


pi∗tn , for n = N − (n− 1), N − (n− 2) · · ·N − 1,
pitn , for n = N − n.
(5.6)
For convenience, denote ϕtN−n = ϕ(tN−n, CtN−n , StN−n). Assume JtN−n = i. From
XpitN = X
pi
tN−(n−1)
+
N−1∑
k=N−(n−1)
∆X∗tk ,
it follows that
EtN−n [− exp(−γtN−n(XpitN + ItN )]
= −e−γtN−nxEtN−n
[
− e−γtN−n∆XpitN−n · EtN−n+1 [e
−γtN−n [
N−1∑
k=N−(n−1)
∆X∗tk
+ItN ]
]
]
= EtN−n [−e−γtN−n∆X
pi
tN−n · e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−(n−1) ]
:= −e−γtN−nxgN−n(α, β, ·).
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Here for k = N − (n− 1), · · · , N − 2, N − 1,
∆X∗tk = α
∗
tk
(µctkh+
√
hσctk∆b
1
tk
) + ∆Dtk + ϕ(tk, Ctk , Stk)h,
and
gN−n(α, β, ·) = EtN−n [−e−γtN−n∆X
pi
tN−n · e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−(n−1) ]
=
1
2
e
−γtN−nα(µctN−nh+σ
c
tN−n
√
h)
EtN−n
[
e−γtN−nβ(∆DtN−n+ϕtN−nh)e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |AtN−n
]
+
1
2
e
−γtN−nα(µctN−nh−σ
c
tN−n
√
h)
EtN−n
[
e−γtN−nβ(∆DtN−n+ϕtN−nh)e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |ActN−n
]
with AtN−n := {∆b1tN−n = 1} and ActN−n := {∆b1tN−n = −1}. Arguing as in the one period
case we get
gN−n(0, 0, ·) = EtN−n [e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 ] ≤ ∞;
gN−n(∞, β, ·) =∞; gN−n(−∞, β, ·) =∞;
From arbitrage considerations it follows that
DtN−n(ω) ∈ [inf
Q
E
Q[DtN−n+1 ], sup
Q
E
Q[DtN−n+1 ]],
where Q is the set of probability measures. Thus
∆DtN−n(ω) ∈ [DtN−n+1 − sup
Q
E
Q[DtN−n+1 ], DtN−n+1 − inf
Q
E
Q[DtN−n+1 ]],
so the sets: {ω : ∆DtN−n(ω) > 0}, and {ω : ∆DtN−n(ω) < 0} have positive probability.
Consequently, it follows that:
gN−n(α,∞, ·) =∞; gN−n(α,−∞, ·) =∞.
Therefore the minimum of gN−n(α, β, ·) is a critical point. Hence
∂gN−n
∂α
=
(µctN−nh + σ
c
tN−n
√
h)
2
e
−γtN−nα(µctN−nh+σ
c
tN−n
√
h)
×EtN−n
[
e−γtN−nβ
∗(∆DtN−n+ϕtN−nh)e
−γ(i)Y ∗tN−n+1 |AtN−n
]
+
(µctN−nh− σctN−n
√
h)
2
e
−γtN−nα(µctN−nh−σ
c
tN−n
√
h)
×EtN−n
[
e−γtN−nβ
∗(∆DtN−n+ϕtN−nh)e
−γtN−nY ∗tN−n+1 |ActN−n
]
= 0. (5.7)
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By direct calculation, we get that the optimal time consistent trading strategy is
α∗tN−n =
1
2γtN−nσ
c
tN−n
√
h
log[
1 + rctN−n
√
h
1− rctN−n
√
h
]
+
1
2γtN−nσ
c
tN−n
√
h
log(
EtN−n [e
−γtN−nβ∗tN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |AtN−n ]
EtN−n [e
−γtN−nβ∗tN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |ActN−n ]
).
(5.8)
From the equilibrium conditions it follows that β∗tN−n = 1. This combined with
∂gN−n
∂β
= 0,
yield the equilibrium price at TN−n. First, from
∂gN−n
∂β
= 0, one gets
EtN−n
[
(∆DtN−n + ϕtN−nh) · e−γtN−n (∆DtN−n+ϕtN−nh)e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |AtN−n
]
= −e2γtN−nασctN−n
√
h
EtN−n
[
(∆DtN−n + ϕtN−nh) · e−γtN−n (∆DtN−n+ϕtN−nh)e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |ActN−n
]
.
From ∂gN−n
∂α
= 0 it follows that
e
2γtN−nα
∗σctN−n
√
h
=
(1 + rctN−n
√
h)EtN−n [e
−γtN−nβ∗DtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |AtN−n ]
(1− rctN−n
√
h)EtN−n [e
−γ(i)β∗DtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |ActN−n ]
This together with
∆DtN−n + ϕtN−nh = DtN−n+1 − EQ
∗
tN−n
[DtN−n+1 ],
(here Q∗ is the equilibrium probability measure to be found) yield
(
2
1− rctN−n
√
h
)EQ
∗
tN−n
[DtN−n+1 ]
=
EtN−n [DtN−n+1e
−γtN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |AtN−n ]
EtN−n [e
−γtN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |AtN−n ]
+
(1 + rctN−n
√
h)
(1− rctN−n
√
h)
EtN−n [DtN−n+1e
−γtN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |ActN−n ]
EtN−n [e
−γtN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |ActN−n ]
.
Consequently
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DtN−n − ϕtN−nh =
1− rctn
√
h
2
EtN−n [DtN−n+1e
−γtN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |AtN−n ]
EtN−n [e
−γtN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |AtN−n ]
+
1 + rctn
√
h
2
EtN−n [DtN−n+1e
−γtN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |ActN−n ]
EtN−n [e
−γtN−nDtN−n+1e−γtN−nY
∗
tN−n+1 |ActN−n ]
.
(5.9)
Thus, the equilibrium price is
DtN−n = EtN−n [(DtN−n+1 + ϕtN−nh)Λ
∗
tN−n+1
], (5.10)
with Λ∗tN−n+1 defined in (3.11).
5.3 Appendix C: Proof of Corollary 3.2
We consider the time period [(N − n)h, (N − n+ 1)h). Recall that
XˆtN = x+∆XˆtN−n +
N−1∑
k=N−(n−1)
∆Xˆtk ,
where
∆Xˆtk = αˆtk(µ
c
tk
h+
√
hσctk∆b
1
tk
) + βˆtk(∆Dtk + ϕ(tk, Ctk , Stk)h),
for k = N − (n− 1), · · · , N − 2, N − 1. Thus, we have
EtN−n(U
′(WˆtN ))
= EtN−n [−e−γ∆XˆtN−n · e−γYˆtN−(n−1) ]
=
1
2
e
−γαˆtN−n (µctN−nh+σ
c
tN−n
√
h)
e−γϕtN−nhEtN−n
[
e−γ∆DtN−ne−γYˆtN−n+1 |AtN−n
]
+
1
2
e
−γαˆtN−n (µctN−nh−σ
c
tN−n
√
h)
e−γϕtN−nhEtN−n
[
e−γ∆DtN−ne−γYˆtN−n+1 |ActN−n
]
.
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From direct calculations, it follows that on the set {ω : ω ∈ ActN−n}
EtN−n+1 [U
′(WˆtN )]
EtN−n [U
′(WˆtN )]
=
(1 + rctN−n
√
h)e
γαˆtN−nσ
c
tN−n
√
h
e
−γαˆtN−nσc
√
h∆b
t1
N−ne−γDtN−n+1 e−γYˆtN−n+1
EtN−n
[
e−γDtN−n+1e−γYˆtN−n+1 |ActN−n
]
= λtN−n
e−γDtN−n+1 e−γYˆtN−n+1
EtN−n [e
−γDtN−n+1e−γYˆtN−n+1 |ActN−n ]
.
Moreover, on the set of {ω : ω ∈ AtN−n}
EtN−n+1 [U
′(WˆtN )]
EtN−n [U
′(WˆtN )]
= λtN−n
e−γDtN−n+1e−γYˆtN−n+1
EtN−n [e
−γDtN−n+1e−γYˆtN−n+1 |AtN−n ]
.
Therefore
EtN−n+1 [U
′(WˆtN )]
EN−n[U ′(WˆtN )]
= ΛˆtN−n+1 . (5.11)
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